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porations in order to garner investment banking business. Dabit's
claims were brought under state law
for breach of fiduciary duty and
breach of the contract duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and he sought
to pursue these claims as a class
action.
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of law at Washburn University
School of Law, where he serves
as the director of the Washburn
University Business &
Transactional Law Center.
He can be reached at
steven.ramirez@washhurn.edu
or 785-249-4032.

He claims he was fraudulently
induced to hold securities, as
opposed to being induced to buy or
sell them. The circuit courts are
split on the question of whether
Dabit's claims remain viable. The
Seventh Circuit would dismiss such
claims as preempted by federal law.
The Second Circuit would permit
such claims to the extent they
revolve around the holding of securities as opposed to the purchase or
sale of securities. Holding claims
have long been found not viable
under federal law.

In 1995, Congress enacted (over
presidential veto) the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA), which restricted investor
remedies under the federal securities laws. Thereafter, investors
sought to redress wrongdoing by
corporate insiders under state law.
Congress responded by enacting the
Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA),
which further restricted investor
rights against corporate management by preempting rights investors
had under state law. Specifically,
under SLUSA, any class action alleging a misrepresentation of a material fact "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security issued by
a publicly held company must be
brought in federal court under the
more restrictive PSLRA.

(Continted on Page 216)

Shadi Dabit brings claims arising
from the very well-publicized misconduct of Merrill Lynch in recommending securities, under the guise
of its research analyses, when in
fact its recommendations were
aimed at currying the favor of cor-
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ISSUE
Does the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 preempt state law claims brought as
class actions for fraudulently inducing holders of securities of public
companies to continue to hold their
securities (as opposed to purchase
securities) because such holding is
"inconnection with the purchase or
sale" of securities, even though federal law recognizes no remedy for
such a holding claim?

FACTS
Dabit is a former broker with Merrill
Lynch. In 2002, he filed this action
on behalf of himself and other former and current Merrill Lynch brokers, alleging that Merrill Lynch distorted its research reports to attract
investment banking business by
overrating stocks. Dabit's claim was
based upon the investigation undertaken by New York Attorney
General Elliot Spitzer. Spitzer's
2002 investigation found that
Merrill Lynch research analysts gave
stocks glowing recommendations,
while privately terming such stocks
"crap" or a "dog." Merrill Lynch has
publicly apologized for its misconduct, has paid substantial fines and
judgments, and has faced numerous
law enforcement and regulatory
inquiries and sanctions.
Dabit seeks recovery for two kinds
of losses. First, he claims losses for
himself and other members of the
class for damages for holding securities based upon Merrill Lynch's
deceptive research analyses.
Second, he claims losses suffered by
the class from the loss of clients
who closed their accounts in the
wake of revelations of Merrill
Lynch's misconduct. The putative
class was defined as Merrill Lynch
brokers who suffered losses from
holding stocks based upon the
flawed Merrill Lynch research
reports or those who lost clients

because of Merrill Lynch's misconduct. The class time period is from
i December 1, 1999, to December 31,
2000.
Dabit pursued recovery under state
law for breach of fiduciary duty and
breach of the contractual duty of
good faith and fair dealing in the
federal district court for Oklahoma
under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. The district court ruled that
SLUSA preempts claims based upon
the purchase or sale of securities
and dismissed the complaint with
leave to file an amended complaint
for "claims based on wrongfully
induced holding." Dabit's amended
complaint was transferred to the
Southern District of New York, by
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, where it was administered with 120 other actions against
Merrill Lynch related to its biased
research reports. Following transfer,
Dabit's amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice. The court
found that Dabit's claims were all
"in connection with the purchase or
sale of a nationally traded security"
within the meaning of SLUSA, even
though Dabit's claims were carefully
crafted to remove any reference to
the purchase of securities and
instead referenced only the wrongfully induced holding of securities.
The court's conclusion was based
upon the finding that Dabit's claims
.'were based on the very same
alleged transactions and occurrences" involved in the federal litigation surrounding the Merrill
Lynch research reports. The court
therefore concluded that the holding claims were squarely within the
ambit of SLUSA and dismissed.
Dabit appealed to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Second Circuit reversed in part
and affirmed in part. Recognizing
that in crafting SLUSA Congress
borrowed the "in connection with"
language from Section 10(b) of the

216

Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the Second Circuit construed the
identical language from SLUSA in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court's
construction of that language from
Section 10(b) in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975). There, the Supreme Court
found that the "in connection with
the purchase or sale" of securities
language meant that only purchasers and sellers had standing to
bring claims under Section 10(b).
Therefore, the Second Circuit held
that only claims relying upon a
wrongfully induced purchase are
within the scope of SLUSA's preemption. Because the Dabit complaint did not negate the possibility
of that-it included claims of wrongfully induced purchases-the
Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint; but, it permitted the plaintiff to amend his
complaint to clarify that the claims
at issue allege no misrepresentation
in connection with any purchase.
Rather, the plaintiff must show the
misrepresentations at issue only
induced the plaintiff to retain the
securities.
Merrill Lynch sought review from
the U.S. Supreme Court and on
September 27, 2005, its petition for
a writ of certiorari was granted.
CASE ANALYSIS
This case has its roots in the
PSLRA, which was enacted as part
of Newt Gingrich's Contract with
America. The PSLRA imposed
heightened pleading requirements
upon plaintiffs in federal securities
litigation, restricted the availability
of class actions, imposed something
close to a "loser pays" fee-shifting
regime, and created a safe harbor
for forward-looking frauds, among
other things. The PSLRA became
law over President Clinton's veto
and has remained controversial
through the present day. Indeed,

Issue No. 4

many commentators assign some
degree of blame to the PSLRA for
the flood of corporate wrongdoing
that came to light beginning in late
2001 with revelations of widespread
fraud at Enron Corporation. Others
claim that restricting the ability of
investors to recover for corporate
wrongdoing has been beneficial in
limiting strike suits.

strange" if the Court's decision in
Blue Chip Stamps, which imposed a
standing requirement on private
plaintiffs to be either a purchaser or
a seller in order to bar "potentially
vexatious" holding claims, could
now be used to save holding claims
from the preemptive sweep of
SLUSA.

On the other hand, a number of
courts, in addition to the Second
Whatever its merits or demerits,
Circuit, have found that Blue Chip
after the PSLRA became law plainStamps does indeed countenance
tiffs shifted claims out of federal
this result. The Court in Blue Chip
court and pursued state-based remeStamps stated that "the wording of
dies in state court to avoid the stric§ 10(b), making fraud in connection
tures of the PSLRA. In 1998,
with the purchase or sale of a secuCongress responded with SLUSA.
rity a violation of the Act, is surely
Essentially, SLUSA requires that
badly strained when construed to"
any class action involving allegaI encompass claims by nonpurchasers
tions of misrepresentation "inconand nonsellers. The Eighth Circuit
nection with the purchase or sale"
and the Eleventh Circuit have thus
of a nationally traded security be
brought in federal court under the
held that Blue Chip Stamps operPSLRA. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1).
ates to save holding claims from the
preemptive sweep of SLUSA. Riley
The "in connection with" language
v. Merrill Lynch, 292 F.3d 494 (11th
has a long history in securities law.
Cir. 2002); Green v. Ameritrade,
In Blue Chip Stamps the Court
Inc., 279 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2002).

relied on the same language from
Section 10(b), which authorizes
antifraud measures, including private claims for securities fraud, to
find that only purchasers or sellers
of securities-not mere holders of
securities-may assert claims for
securities fraud. More recently, in
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813

(2002), the Court held that any misrepresentations "coinciding" with
the purchase or sale of securities
meets the "in connection with"
requirement.
Judge Easterbrook, in Kircherv.
Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478

(7th Cir. 2005), found that this language from Zandford supports the
conclusion that the "in connection
with" language means only that the
fraud at issue concerns securities
transactions, rather than some other kind of activity. He further found
that "it would be more than a little

Against this backdrop, the petitioner's arguments rely upon a broad
reading of SLUSA. The following is
an excerpt of their argument:
"Congress set forth SLUSA's preemptive scope and effect in
extremely broad language: 'No covered class action' which is 'based
upon the statutory or common law
of any State' may be maintained in
'any State or Federal court' 'by any
private party' who 'allege[s]' either a
misrepresentation of a material fact
or a deceptive device or contrivance
'in connection with the purchase or
sale of a covered security.' ...
"The operative language of SLUSA's
preemption provision that is relevant to this case, 'in connection
with the purchase or sale' of a ...
security, tracks the language contained in the 1934 Act, which this

Court has broadly interpreted as not
limiting coverage to deception of an
identifiable purchaser or seller.
"The court of appeals held that
putative plaintiffs may avoid the
preemptive scope of SLUSA and
proceed with their state law class
actions if they allege that they held,
rather than purchased or sold, securities as a result of the alleged misrepresentations. In so deciding, the
court imported into SLUSA's preemption provision an extratextual
purchaser-seller limitation. Yet, the
purchaser-seller rule upon which
the court relied was created by this
Court on policy grounds as a standing limitation on the judicially created private damages remedy ...
"The court of appeals' interpretation
of the scope of SLUSA's preemption
provision as limited by the 'purchaser-seller' standing rule is therefore
inconsistent with the plain language
and natural meaning of the broad
statutory text. In addition, the court
of appeals' decision frustrates the
legislative scheme enacted in
SLUSA, by which Congress sought
to further a uniform national legal
regime with respect to nationally
traded securities by disallowing private class actions from proceeding
under disparate state substantive
and procedural standards."
The import of Merrill Lynch's argument would be that the plaintiff be
deprived of any state law claims and
relegated to pursue relief under federal law. However, federal law recognizes no claim for holders, as
opposed to purchasers or sellers, of
securities. Thus, plaintiffs would be
left to no claim at all for any misconduct committed in connection
with holding securities.
The respondent's argument relies
on a more limited conception of
preemption.
(Continued on Page 218)
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"A private plaintiff alleging that a
defendant's bad acts caused a
decrease in the value of an investment has not 'alleg[ed]' wrongdoing
'in connection with the purchase or
sale of a covered security' under
SLUSA, unless the plaintiff also
alleges that the defendant's misstatements or omissions were made
in connection with the plaintiffs
purchase or sale. That interpretation of SLUSA flows from the text
of the statute, accords with this
Court's presumption against preemption, fulfills Congress's purpose
in enacting SLUSA, and is necessary
to ensure the integrity of the
Nation's securities markets ...
"First, in private securities litigation
under ... the phrase 'in connection
with the purchase or sale' has a settled judicial interpretation: A private party does not assert a claim
'in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security' within the
meaning of section 10(b) ... unless
that party avers that the defendant's
act or omission was in connection
with her own purchase or sale."
SLUSA applies solely to private
suits for damages and should be
interpreted in accordance with
this Court's cases construing section
10 (b) ...
"Second, this Court presumes that
Congress does not intend to preempt traditional state-law causes of
action. The States have regulated
the securities industry for more
than 150 years, and investors have
brought state-law holder claims for
more than a century. Petitioner and
its amici exaggerate the need for
uniformity in the securities industry, which provides no warrant for
disregarding the traditional presumption against preemption ...
"Third, Congress's purpose, as evidenced by the legislative history,
was to preempt only those claims
that could have been brought under

broader the phrase "in connection
with" is found to be, then the broader is the SEC's enforcement authority under Section 10(b). This militates in favor of the SEC arguing for
a broad interpretation of "in connection with," even though that
means a broader preemptive sweep
under SLUSA and therefore less private litigation to supplement the
i SEC's resources. Thus, the SEC
posits that Blue Chip Stamps was a
"Fourth, state-law class actions are
standing case, and not a construcnecessary to deter fraud in the secution of "in connection with." The
SEC further argues that there is
rities industry. The limitations of
public securities enforcement have
need for uniformity that would be
repeatedly been recognized by
compromised if plaintiffs could
bring claims for being wrongfully
Congress, this Court, and the SEC
induced to hold securities. Finally,
itself. Petitioner's proposed construction of SLUSA would functionthe SEC argues that the Second
ally eliminate any right of action, in
Circuit's decision "would have the
perverse effect of reading a law
any courtroom at any level, for mildesigned to eliminate abusive
lions of defrauded investors. By
and meritless lawsuits to preserve
denying investors the opportunity to
the suits most likely to be abusive
pursue legitimate but low-value
and meritless."
claims through class actions, peti-

federal law. Congress enacted
SLUSA to prevent plaintiffs from
i evading heightened federal pleading
requirements by filing such claims
in state court under the guise of
state law. Congress intended to
secure a cause of action to all legitimately aggrieved investors, preserving state-law class actions where
state law presented the only available remedy.

tioner's preferred interpretation
would ensure that the many
American households with modest
long-term savings will never be compensated adequately for their losses.
Such a construction of SLUSA is
contrary to the long tradition of private securities enforcement and
unnecessary as a practical matter.
State legislatures and state courts
are more than capable of establishing workable standards to manage
non-purchaser and non-seller claims
and to prevent frivolous suits."
Accordingly, the respondent seeks
to uphold the Second Circuit's
holding.
The Securities and Exchange
Commission submitted one of many
amicus briefs. Its argument is that
class actions and liberal discovery
rules "create a substantial risk of
abusive and counterproductive
'strike' suits." The SEC also is concerned that the scope of its enforcement authority is at stake. The
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SIGNIFICANCE
In recent decades, the Court has
been hostile to private litigation
under the federal securities laws. It
seems to think such litigation is
"vexatious" and economically
harmful because it operates to
enrich class counsel at the expense
of corporations. Since the real
parties in interest are current shareholders who rarely commit fraud,
commentators have generally not
been charitable toward private securities litigation. Thus, the Court,
following this lead, has repeatedly
cut back the viability of private
securities litigation.
The respondent's brief seeks to
make much of recent scandals that
have arguably sprouted up in the
backwater of the Court's reluctance
to enforce the securities laws vigorously in the context of private litigation. Thus, the respondent seems to
be hoping that recent corporate
scandals will temper the Court's evi-
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denced bias against strong private
enforcement of the securities laws.
Certainly, the Court is well aware of
the harm to investor confidence
that occurred in the wake of the
historic run of fraud that was
revealed beginning in 2001, and
continuing to the present day. This
harm to investor confidence will
necessarily raise the cost of capital
to American business. Nevertheless,
the Court may well leave that job to
Congress and continue its efforts to
restrict private securities litigation.
In terms of the specific claims
at stake in this case, there were
many holders of securities of
many public companies that may
have committed fraud. If SLUSA
has not abolished these claims,
under the guise of SLUSA's preemption of class litigation, then one
may expect to see many more classaction holding claims under the
laws of various states.
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Burdens/standards of proof As a general matter, the party in a
lawsuit asserting a claim or defense
has the burden of presenting evidence that establishes the claim or
defense. This is known as the
burden of proof.
There are three burdens of
proof. From the least to the most
demanding, they are the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of
proof; the clear-and-convincing
burden of proof; and the beyond-areasonable-doubt burden of proof.
The first two burdens can apply in
either criminal or civil cases, while
the third applies only in criminal
cases and then only to the
prosecution.
There are no ready definitions
for these burdens. There are, however, working definitions. Under
the preponderance standard, the
party with the burden of proof is
required to come forward with
credible evidence establishing that
a claim or defense is more likely
true than not. Under the clear-andconvincing standard, the party
with the burden of proof is expected to present evidence establishing
that the claim or defense is quite
likely true. Under the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard, the
prosecution must present such
evidence of the defendant's guilt
that a reasonable person would
not hesitate to find the defendant
guilty. See Victor v. ANcbraska,
114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
Class action lawsuit - As a general rule, a class action lawsuit is
one in which one or several named
individuals sue for themselves and
others believed to have sustained
injuries or losses similar to those
sustained by the named plaintiffs,
but who, at the time the case is
filed, are unknown both as to their
identities and their actual numbers. In order for a plaintiffs lawsuit to be given class action status,
the named plaintiff must show that
(1) the class is so large as to make
it impracticable to specify each
and every plaintiff by name,
(2) there exist questions of law or

.-

'

fact common to all members of the
plaintiff class, (3) the claims of the
named plaintiffs are representative
of the claims of the unnamed
plaintiffs, and (4) the named plaintiffs can fairly and adequately represent the interests of the entire
plaintiff class. (Note: Less common
is the class action lawsuit in which
the class is composed of named
and unnamed defendants or in
which both the plaintiffs and
the defendant's side of the case
constitute a class.)
Collateral review (see also habeas
corpus) - Collateral review is the
criminal law's fail-safe mechanism.
It is intended to ensure that a conviction and sentence satisfy the
requirements imposed by law,
constitutional and statutory. As its
name suggests, collateral review
looks at a convicted defendant's trial and in some cases the sentencing proceeding; it is not, however, a
second trial. As a general rule, collateral review is limited to
issues of law.
To be eligible for collateral
review, the petitioning party must
be in custody at the time the
process begins. Typically but not
necessarily, custody means imprisonment. For those convicted of
state-law crimes, collateral review
is available under state law and federal law, the latter in the form of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
As a general rule, state-law petitioners must exhaust all avenues of
collateral review under state law
before filing a federal habeas
corpus petition. For federal-law
petitioners, federal habeas corpus
review is available after certain
post-conviction avenues such as a
motion to vacate a conviction or
sentence have been exhausted.
For both state-law and federallaw petitioners, federal habeas corpus review begins in a trial-level
court but, in the collateral-review
context, the trial court functions as
a reviewing court. However, if the
federal habeas corpus petitioner is
unsuccessful in habeas court, he or
she is permitted, within limiting

procedural rules, to seek further
rev'iew of the habeas court's
decision in the appropriate intermediate federal appeals court and,
if unsuccessful there, in the
Supreme Court.
Damages - In law, damages means
money given to a party whose legal
interests have been injured. While
there are several types of damages
that can be given to an injured party, two of the most prominent
types are compensatory damages
and punitive damages.
An award of compensatory
damages is a sum of money
intended to make the injured party
whole, insofar as this is possible.
An award of punitive damages is
intended to punish the wrongdoer
in order to deter future wrongdoing.
Usually, punitive damages go to the
injured party and are over and
above any award of compensator,
damages. However, in some states,
a portion of any punitive damages
award goes to the state treasury.
Direct review - In American criminal law, a defendant is tried once,
but the trial itself can be reviewed
many times by many appellate
courts. One channel of review is
called direct review because it is
initiated by a first appeal as a matter of statutory right. Direct review
also is wide-ranging review because
the convicted defendant is permitted to raise all procedurally proper
issues regarding the trial court's
disposition of his or her case including issues of law, issues of
fact, and issues concerning the trial
judge's use of discretion.
If the first appeal is resolved
against the convicted defendant,
appellate rules permit the defendant to seek discretionary review
by still higher courts, generally by
the highest court of the convicting
state and then by the United States
Supreme Court. (In federal criminal cases, the convicted defendant's
initial appeal as a matter of right is
to a circuit court of appeals and
then as a matter of discretion to
the Supreme Court.) If these courts
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decline to hear the defendant's case
or hear the case but decide against
the defendant, or if the defendant
defaults on his or her right to seek
discretionary review, the direct
review process ends and it is said
that the defendant's conviction and
sentence are final. At this point,
the only avenue of relief from a
conviction or sentence - retrial,
resentencing, or outright release is collateral review, defined above.
Discovery - Discovery is a
pretrial device in which each party
to a lawsuit seeks information from
the other party as well as from nonparties believed to have knowledge
relevant to the issues in the case.
The plaintiff seeks information
through discovery to make his or
her case; the defendant seeks
information to support any
defenses that may be available.
Diversity - This term is used
whenever a federal court has jurisdiction over a case that does not
involve a question of federal law.
While there are several types of
diversity jurisdiction, the most
common type has two requirements: (1) the plaintiff and the
defendant are residents of different
states; (2) the dollar amount of the
dispute between the parties is at
least 875,000, exclusive of interest
and costs.
En banc - The term literally
means "full bench." Cases in the
federal circuit courts of appeals are
typically heard and decided by
panels of three judges who are
drawn from all the judges in that
circuit. In rare instances, the court
may subsequently agree to have
the case reargued, this time in
front of more or all of the judges
from that circuit.
Habeas corpus - Under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.
§2254 (1994), a person held in
state/local custody who believes
that his or her custody violates
federal law - typically, the
Constitution - may challenge that
custody by filing a petition for a
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writ (i.e., an order) of habeas corpus in federal district court. If the
petitioner wins, he or she must be
released or retried, at the option of
the prosecuting authority.
Per curiam opinion - This term
literally means "the opinion of the
court," the Supreme Court or any
appellate court. Because the opinion
is the court's opinion, there is no
indication of which justice/judge
wrote it.
Plurality opinion - This term
denotes an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in which
there is no majority opinion; that
is, fewer than a bare majority of
five justices were able to agree on
the legal basis for the Court's
action in affirming, reversing, or
vacating a lower court decision.
In some cases, the Court's
opinion can be a partialplurality
opinion. A partial plurality opinion
is one in which at least one part
of the opinion represents the views
of four or fewer Justices. For an
example of a partial plurality opinion, see Hubbardv. United States,
115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995) (Parts IV
and V, a plurality of three Justices;
Parts I, II, III, and VI, a majority of
six Justices).
Preemption - Under the
Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
VI, § 2, federal law - whether
based on the Constitution, a
statute, or a treaty - takes precedence over state or local law on the
same matter. In other words, if
federal law addresses a matter,
either expressly or by implication,
it trumps and renders unenforceable any state or local law on the
matter.
Qualified immunity - Qualified
immunity is a defense that can be
raised by a government employee
whenever there is uncertainty
about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of certain actions taken by the
employee, actions claimed by the
plaintiff to be unlawful. A government employee can avoid a trial
under this defense if the employee
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can show that, at the time of the
complained-of action, he or she
could not have known that it
violated the law.
Strict scrutiny - Strict scrutiny is
a searching level of judicial review
applied to governmental actions
- federal, state, and local challenged as unconstitutional.
Strict scrutiny requires the
governmental actor to show that
it had a compelling reason to
take the challenged action and that
the action taken goes no further
than necessary - is narrowly
tailored - to advance the cited
compelling reason.
Summary judgment - This is the
name of a procedural device available to either party to a civil lawsuit
that enables one or the other party
to win without a trial. A party seeking summary judgment is entitled to
a judgment in its favor if there is no
genuine dispute about the pertinent
facts, and, based on those undisputed facts, the law compels a judgment
for the party who has asked for a
favorable ruling.
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COVERING THE COURT'S ENTIRE FEBRUARY
CALENDAR OF CASES, INCLUDING ...

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS ET AL. V.
PERRY ET AL.
In 2003, the Republican-controlled Texas legislature redrew the
lines for its 32 congressional districts. The redistricting plan
replaced a court-drawn plan that was enacted following the 2000
census and after the legislature was unable to draw its own plan.
Various plaintiffs challenged the plan on the grounds that it violated
the one-person, one-vote requirement, constituted an impermissible
political gerrymander, and diluted the votes of voters of color in violation of the Voting Rights Act and that mid-decade redistricting
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

MARSHALL V. MARSHALL
In this case, the Court is asked to determine the vitality of the socalled probate exception to federal court jurisdiction that generally
limits, if not prohibits, federal courts from hearing litigation relating
to the probate of a decedent's estate. The Court's consideration of
the continuing validity of the probate exception follows a similar
reconsideration of the domestic relations exception in Ankenbrandt
v. Richards, a 1992 case in which the Supreme Court upheld the
domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction.
www.supremecourtpreview.org
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Legal Floliday
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FEBRUARY

Rapanos et al. v. United
States and Carabell v.
United States Army Corps
of Engineers et al.

E5DAY

FEBRUARY

22

Samson v. California
Holmes v. South Carolina

S. D. Warren Company v.
Maine Board of
Environmental Protection
et al.
FEBRUARY

27

Arkansas Department of
Health and Human
Services et al. v. Ahlborn

FEBRUARY

28

Randall et al. v. Sorrell et
al.

MARCH

DaimlerChryslerCorp et al. v.
Cuno et al. and Wilkins et al. v.
Cuno et al.

Marshall v. Marshall
Day v. Crosby

Northern Insurance Company of
New York v. Chatham Count,
Georgia
League of United Latin American
Citizens et al. v. Perry et al.
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